¿«Avasalla» la Sala 3.ª del Tribunal Supremo al Consejo General del Poder Judicial?(De nuevo sobre el control judicial de la discrecionalidad)

Abstract

This article focuses on analyzing an individual opi nion to a Supreme Court’s ruling that annulled a discretional appointment to the General Council of the Judiciary. The arguments in that opi nion are critically observed from a general-theoretical point of view and not fr om the standpoint of the particularities of the case (even though at the beginning a profile of it is given in order to make the terms of the issue comprehensible). The critical considerations turn on the following subjects: the necessity of a substantive motivation (not only a formal one) in discretional appointments, th e faulty approach within the dichotomy between «discretional appointment» – «merit competition», the contextual motivation, discretion is not mere freedom, the inaccurate importation of two procedural elements (joint assessment and im mediacy), the different methodology used in the assessment depending on the «all or nothing» or «more or less» approach.