How far does the user-illusion go?Dennett on knowing what we think

  1. Agustín Vicente 1
  2. Marta Jorba 1
  1. 1 Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
    info

    Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

    Lejona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/000xsnr85

Revista:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Año de publicación: 2018

Volumen: 37

Número: 3

Páginas: 205-221

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Resumen

El libro de Dennett From Bacteria to Bach and Back desarrolla una fascinante historia respecto de cómo nosotros, miembros de la especie homo sapiens, nos hemos convertido en criaturas que no sólo actúan por razones, sino que también pueden comprender esas razones. De acuerdo con Dennett, esta capacidad de representarnos nuestras razones depende en gran medida en nuestra capacidad para internalizar intercambios lingüísticos en la forma de habla interna. Por otra parte, Dennett mantiene que el auto-conocimiento es una ilusión. Argumentamos que el punto de vista de Dennett sobre el papel del habla interna entraña en última instancia que existe un límite a los poderes que tienen las apps de interfaz para engañar a sus usuarios. En particular, tanto la fuerza como el contenido de un pensamiento son directamente cognoscibles, tanto si el pensamiento se presenta con el ropaje de una imagen auditiva, como si no. En (al menos) tal caso, mantenemos que no hay ilusión del usuario. La app acierta con lo que hay

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Información de financiación

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Financial support for this work was provided by the Ekonomiaren Gara-pen eta Lehiakortasun Saila, Eusko Jaurlaritza (IT769-13) and by the MINECO, Spanish Government, research project FFI2016-80588-R (M.J) and postdoctoral fellowship FJCI-2015-23620 (M.J).

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