How far does the user-illusion go?Dennett on knowing what we think

  1. Agustín Vicente 1
  2. Marta Jorba 1
  1. 1 Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
    info

    Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

    Lejona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/000xsnr85

Journal:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Year of publication: 2018

Volume: 37

Issue: 3

Pages: 205-221

Type: Article

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More publications in: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Abstract

Dennett’s From bacteria to Bach and back develops a fascinating story as to how we sapiens became creatures that not only act for reasons but can comprehend such reasons. According to Dennett, this ability of representing our reasons to ourselves, depends mostly on our ability to internalize linguistic exchanges in the form of self-talk or inner speech. On the other hand, Dennett holds that self-knowledge is illusory. We argue that Dennett’s view about the role of inner speech ultimately entails that there is a limit to the deceiving powers of user-friendly apps. In particular, both the force and the content of a thought event are directly knowable, whether or not the thought comes in the clothes of auditory imagery. In (at least) such a case, we submit, there is no user-illusion. The app gets things right. KEYWORDS: Dennet; User-

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Funding information

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Financial support for this work was provided by the Ekonomiaren Gara-pen eta Lehiakortasun Saila, Eusko Jaurlaritza (IT769-13) and by the MINECO, Spanish Government, research project FFI2016-80588-R (M.J) and postdoctoral fellowship FJCI-2015-23620 (M.J).

Funders

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