El Principio del Altruismo Procreativouna visión crítica

  1. Miguel Beriain, Íñigo de 1
  2. Payán Ellakuria, Ekain 2
  1. 1 Investigador posdoctoral de la UPV/EHU en la Cátedra Interuniversitaria de Derecho y Genoma Humano
  2. 2 Cátedra Interuniversitaria de Derecho y Genoma Humano
Journal:
Revista Iberoamericana de Bioética

ISSN: 2529-9573

Year of publication: 2017

Issue Title: Genética y Humanismo

Issue: 3

Type: Article

DOI: 10.14422/RIB.I03.Y2017.008 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Revista Iberoamericana de Bioética

Abstract

The Principle of Procreative Altruism has been recently proposed in the bioethics literature by two eminent authors, Tom Douglas and Katrien Devolder. According to their definition, the Principle states that “If couples (or single reproducers) have decided to have a child, and selection is possible, they have significant moral reason to select a child whose existence can be expected to contribute more to (or detract less from) the well-being of others than any alternative child they could have.” This paper is aimed to analyze the consistency of this principle and to introduce some considerations devoted to exclude any kind of unmoral consequence of its use.

Data source: Dialnet