Imparcialidad y demarcación de valores en la actividad científica

  1. Juan Bautista Bengoetxea 1
  1. 1 Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
    info

    Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

    Lejona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/000xsnr85

Revista:
CTS: Revista iberoamericana de ciencia, tecnología y sociedad

ISSN: 1668-0030,  1850-0013

Año de publicación: 2024

Volumen: 19

Número: 55

Páginas: 107-125

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.52712/ISSN.1850-0013-422 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: CTS: Revista iberoamericana de ciencia, tecnología y sociedad

Resumen

This article focuses on a new type of tension, identified within the philosophy of scientific practices, between the pretension of developing an impartial science and the accepted fact that there are non-epistemic values presupposed in science. In order to place it in context and to understand its details, we present briefly the value-free ideal (VFI) that underlies it. Its implausibility is now openly recognized in the realm of the philosophy of science about values (epistemic and non-epistemic), primarily in the case of the search for an enhanced impartiality. The myriad of studies on values, however, has made it possible to raise a new problem of demarcation, now located in contexts of uncertainty and risk, focused on the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of the values presupposed by cognitive activities. Here the nexus between values and the question of a purportedly impartial knowledge emerges, for which we propose an attempted solution.

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