Distributive politics and decentralisation in Chile and Peru

  1. Felipe Livert 1
  2. Raymundo Mogollón 2
  3. Herrera Rivera, Pablo 3
  1. 1 Universidad del País Vasco y (UPV/EHU), España
  2. 2 Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina, Lima, Peru
  3. 3 Universidad Diego Portales, Chile
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Revista:
Investigaciones Regionales = Journal of Regional Research

ISSN: 1695-7253,  2340-2717

Año de publicación: 2024

Número: 58

Páginas: 91-111

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.38191/IIRR-JORR.24.004 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Investigaciones Regionales = Journal of Regional Research

Resumen

El artículo presenta evidencia de que la descentralización incrementa la influencia partidista en la asignación de recursos no programáticos. El modelo emplea un análisis de datos de panel y efectos fijos usando datos que corresponden a transferencias intergubernamentales provenientes del nivel nacional, que pasan por el nivel regional y que están destinadas a inversión para los gobiernos locales de Chile (2008-2018) y Perú (2004 – 2013). Los resultados indican influencia política en la distribución de recursos. La distribución de recursos es usada tácticamente en ambos países en los años de elección presidencial. La aplicación de leyes que aumentan la descentralización política en Chile y Perú aumentó el sesgo político en la distribución de los recursos. Los resultados tienen implicancias políticas y permiten obtener una perspectiva comparada del desarrollo de las instituciones fiscales en ambos países. En un escenario continental, en que los países de América Latina están experimentando un fuerte proceso de descentralización, se sugiere avanzar en reformas que incrementen la transparencia, la rendición de cuentas y participación ciudadana. Adicionalmente, es recomendable limitar las asignaciones no programáticas, y brindar estabilidad a la distribución de recursos públicos.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet