Boghossian’s Argument from Inference and Identity Belief Ascriptions

  1. Ekain Garmendia
Libro:
VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 18-20 July 2012
  1. Concha Martínez Vidal (dir. congr.)
  2. José L. Falguera López (dir. congr.)
  3. José M. Sagüillo (dir. congr.)
  4. Víctor M. Verdejo Aparicio (dir. congr.)
  5. Martín Pereira Fariña (dir. congr.)

Editorial: Servicio de Publicaciones e Intercambio Científico ; Universidad de Santiago de Compostela

ISBN: 978-84-9887-939-1

Año de publicación: 2012

Páginas: 198-204

Congreso: Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. Congreso (7. 2012. Santiago de Compostela)

Tipo: Aportación congreso

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Resumen

Boghossian proposed an argument against mental externalism, which claims that if externalism were true our de dicto ascriptions could not offer the rational explanations we expect from them. Here I present and defend an answer to this argument. I claim that the externalist can indeed offer good explanations if she makes use of identity belief ascriptions. In order to defend such a proposal from some possible problems, I superficially characterize a model about what it is to engage in an inference and what it is to offer a rational explanation.

Fuente de los datos: Dialnet