The literalist bias in the autistic spectrum conditionsreview of existing accounts

  1. Agustín Vicente 1
  2. Isabel Martínez González 1
  1. 1 Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
    info

    Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

    Lejona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/000xsnr85

Journal:
Estudios de Psicología = Studies in Psychology

ISSN: 0210-9395,  1579-3699

Year of publication: 2021

Volume: 42

Issue: 2

Pages: 298-333

Type: Article

DOI: 10.1080/02109395.2021.1909248 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

More publications in: Estudios de Psicología = Studies in Psychology

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Abstract

There is a tendency across the Autistic Spectrum Conditions (ASC) to understand non-literal uses of language in a literal way. Different accounts for such a literalist bias have been proposed. Three of them can be considered ‘classical’ by now: the Executive Dysfunction theory, the Theory of Mind theory and the Weak Central Coherence theory. Currently, there is another hypothesis gaining traction, namely the Structural Language hypothesis. In this paper, we critically analyse these four accounts, with a focus on the Structural Language hypothesis, which holds that issues in figurative meaning comprehension relate not to ASC core traits but to structural language problems. We argue that the notion of ‘structural language’ is vague, and also that many studies taken to support the hypothesis have not actually tested the literalist bias. We conclude by suggesting interesting areas for further research.

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