Egiak, munduak eta minak

  1. Garmendia, Ekain 1
  1. 1 Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
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    Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

    Lejona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/000xsnr85

Revista:
Gogoa: Euskal Herriko Unibersitateko hizkuntza, ezagutza, komunikazio eta ekintzari buruzko aldizkaria

ISSN: 1577-9424

Año de publicación: 2021

Título del ejemplar: Kripkeren Naming and Necessityk 40 (+1) urte

Número: 22

Páginas: 3-31

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1387/GOGOA.22606 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Gogoa: Euskal Herriko Unibersitateko hizkuntza, ezagutza, komunikazio eta ekintzari buruzko aldizkaria

Resumen

"Kripkeren Naming and Necessityk 40 (+1) urte" ale bereziaren aurkezpena

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet