Kripke, Perry eta “ni”

  1. de Ponte, María 1
  1. 1 Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
    info

    Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

    Lejona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/000xsnr85

Journal:
Gogoa: Euskal Herriko Unibersitateko hizkuntza, ezagutza, komunikazio eta ekintzari buruzko aldizkaria

ISSN: 1577-9424

Year of publication: 2021

Issue Title: Kripkeren Naming and Necessityk 40 (+1) urte

Issue: 22

Pages: 93-119

Type: Article

DOI: 10.1387/GOGOA.22600 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Gogoa: Euskal Herriko Unibersitateko hizkuntza, ezagutza, komunikazio eta ekintzari buruzko aldizkaria

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on Saul Kripke’s views about the first-person pronoun “I”. Iaim to show how Kripke’s later views on “I” differ from the views expressed in Naming andNecessity, and to contrast it with John Perry’s explanation, which is closer to Kripke’s earlierclaims. I discuss two of Kripke’s later papers: “Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference” and “TheFirst Person”. I first argue that Kripke’s interpretation of Frege is not adequate, and then I showhow Kripke’s own view on the first person derives from this interpretation. I compare Kripke’sviews with those defended by Perry, mostly in his 1977 paper, “Frege on Demonstratives”.Kripke’s proposal includes two basic assumptions: the acceptance of incommunicableThoughts, when it comes to discussing the Fregean view, and the appeal to a Cartesian self toexplain the uses of “I”. These two assumptions are not present in Naming and Necessity andare not needed in a semantic account of the first person pronoun “I”.

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