Los problemas de la Inducción Pesimista. Verdad y certeza en el debate entre el realismo y el anti-realismo

  1. URUEÑA LÓPEZ, Sergio 1
  1. 1 Universidad del País Vasco UPV/EHU
Revista:
Artefactos

ISSN: 1989-3612

Año de publicación: 2018

Volumen: 7

Número: 2

Páginas: 83-105

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.14201/ART20187283105 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Artefactos

Resumen

Este trabajo presenta un análisis del debate entre realistas y anti-realistas tomando como objeto específico de estudio la inducción pesimista y el argumento del no milagro. La hipótesis principal que se defenderá es que la aparente falta de consenso entre realistas y anti-realistas a la hora de abordar el problema de la veracidad de nuestras teorías científicas en el marco de este debate se debe en parte al uso de diferentes marcos conceptuales en torno a la verdad. Concretamente, se argumentará que la inducción pesimista es un argumento escéptico construido sobre un concepto de verdad basado en la certeza que resulta inoperativo para entender la práctica científica. El trabajo se estructura de la siguiente manera. En primer lugar, se caracteriza la inducción pesimista y el argumento del no milagro. A continuación, se presentan las críticas más significativas realizadas a ambos argumentos, así como las réplicas planteadas a los mismos. Ello servirá para, finalmente, identificar y evaluar la validez del concepto de verdad subyacente a cada uno de ellos.

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