Preferences, actions and voting rules
- 1 Universidad del País Vasco,
ISSN: 1869-4195
Année de publication: 2012
Titre de la publication: Salvador Barberà
Volumen: 3
Número: 1-2
Pages: 15-28
Type: Article
D'autres publications dans: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association
Objectifs de Développement Durable
Résumé
In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for “manipulability” (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.
Information sur le financement
This research is supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación under project ECO2009-11213, co-funded by the ERDF, and by Basque Government funding to Grupo Consolidado GIC07/146-IT-377-07. The first author thanks the Basque Government for aid through the “Programas de Ayudas para la Formación y Perfeccionamiento del Personal Investigador del Departamento de Educación, Universidades e Investigación”.Financeurs
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- ECO2009-11213
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Eusko Jaurlaritza
Spain
- GIC07/146-IT-377-07
- European Regional Development Fund European Union