Preferences, actions and voting rules

  1. Alaitz Artabe 1
  2. Annick Laruelle 1
  3. Federico Valenciano 1
  1. 1 Universidad del País Vasco,
Journal:
SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

ISSN: 1869-4195

Year of publication: 2012

Issue Title: Salvador Barberà

Volume: 3

Issue: 1-2

Pages: 15-28

Type: Article

DOI: 10.1007/S13209-011-0040-0 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

Abstract

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for “manipulability” (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.

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Funding information

This research is supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación under project ECO2009-11213, co-funded by the ERDF, and by Basque Government funding to Grupo Consolidado GIC07/146-IT-377-07. The first author thanks the Basque Government for aid through the “Programas de Ayudas para la Formación y Perfeccionamiento del Personal Investigador del Departamento de Educación, Universidades e Investigación”.

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