Externalism, rational explanation, identity premises

  1. Garmendia Mujika, Ekain
Revista:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Año de publicación: 2014

Volumen: 33

Número: 3

Páginas: 31-48

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Referencias bibliográficas

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  • PÉREZ OTERO, M. (2014), 'Boghossian's Inference Argument against Content Externalism Reversed', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84, pp. 159-181.
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  • WILLIAMSON, T. (2000), Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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