Gogoeta batzuk Naming and Necessityri buruz

  1. Devitt, Michael
  2. Kepa Korta trad.
Revista:
Gogoa: Euskal Herriko Unibersitateko hizkuntza, ezagutza, komunikazio eta ekintzari buruzko aldizkaria

ISSN: 1577-9424

Año de publicación: 2021

Título del ejemplar: Kripkeren Naming and Necessityk 40 (+1) urte

Número: 22

Páginas: 63-92

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1387/GOGOA.22599 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Gogoa: Euskal Herriko Unibersitateko hizkuntza, ezagutza, komunikazio eta ekintzari buruzko aldizkaria

Resumen

Artikulu honek Naming and Necessityren berrogeigarren urteurrena ospatzendu, eta batera biltzen ditu urteetan zehar lan horri buruz egin ditudan gogoeta batzuk. Nireustez gaizki ulertu diren liburuko alderdietan jartzen du arreta, edo atzeman ez direnetan,edo oker baztertu direnetan edo, besterik gabe, azpimarratzea merezi dutenetan.Hizkuntzaren filosofiarekin hasten da, lehendabizi erreferentziaren deskripzio-teorienkontrako Kripkeren argudiorik indartsuena, “ezjakite eta akatsa”ren argudioa, eztabaidatuz.Gero Kripkeren “irudi hobea”, kausal-historikoa eta zurruntasunari buruzko bere eztabaidahartzen ditu aintzat, eta, azkenik, “erreferentzia zuzena”, Kripkeri oker egotzitako doktrinaonargaitza. Gainerakoak biologia- eta kimika-klaseei eta banakoei buruz Kripkek proposatudituen doktrina esentzialistez dihardu. Zientziaren filosofo batzuek zorrotz kritikatu dituztedoktrina horiek. Nik uste dut dagozkien zientziek Kripkeren alde egiten dutela, ez kritikoenalde.

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