Production externality and productivity of labor

  1. Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos
Revista:
Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics

ISSN: 0210-1173

Año de publicación: 2011

Número: 196

Páginas: 65-78

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics

Resumen

In this paper we consider two imperfectly competitive industries, with the polluting emissions from one industry harming the productivity of labor in the other. The polluting industry has to pay an environmental tax chosen by the government. In this framework, we analyze how the different organizational structure adopted by workers affect the environmental tax set by the government, total pollution emissions from the polluting industry and the productivity of workers in the industry that suffers the externality. We obtain that this depends on the degree to which pollution emissions from the polluting industry affects the marginal product of labor in the other industry.

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