A note on collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags
- Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor
- Gutiérrez Hita, Carlos
ISSN: 1988-088X
Año de publicación: 2008
Número: 8
Tipo: Documento de Trabajo
Otras publicaciones en: DFAE-II WP Series
Resumen
In this note we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic .rms. We extend a previous note by Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) [Colombo, L., and Labrecciosa, P., 2006. Optimal punishments with detection lags. Economic Letters 92, 198-201] to show how in the presence of detection lags optimal punish- ments fail to restore cooperation also in markets with a low number of .rms.