Estructura de la Negociación Salarial e incentivos a innovar

  1. Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos
  2. Campos, María Luz
Revista:
Estudios de economía

ISSN: 0304-2758 0718-5286

Año de publicación: 2005

Volumen: 32

Número: 1

Tipo: Artículo

Otras publicaciones en: Estudios de economía

Resumen

In this article we analyse the effect that the sequence of salary negotiations has on the firm´s decisions about the adoption of new labour saving technologies. We show that if the cost of the innovation is sufficiently high, innovations are related with sequential as well with simultaneous negotiations. In addition, the cost of the innovation depends on the market size, increases in labour productivity resulting of the new technology and the reserve salary of workers.