Mixed Oligopoly and Environmental Policy

  1. Garzón San Felipe, María Begoña
  2. Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos
Revista:
Spanish economic review

ISSN: 1435-5469

Año de publicación: 2006

Volumen: 8

Número: 2

Páginas: 139-160

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1007/S10108-006-9006-Y DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Otras publicaciones en: Spanish economic review

Resumen

We show in this paper that when there are both public and private firms in product markets (a mixed oligopoly) the decision whether to privatize a public firm interacts with the environmental policy of governments. Therefore, the outcome of the decision whether to privatize a public firm may be different if the government internalizes the environmental damage than if the government ignores it. When the government sets a tax to protect the environment, the tax is lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private one even though the environmental damage is greater. In the mixed oligopoly the marginal cost of the public firm is lower than the market price.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet