Los incentivos de los altos ejecutivos y la asunción de riesgo excesivoel caso de los bancos españoles

Abstract

In this study it is analyzed if the compensation systems of the Spanish banking chief executives officer (CEO) that could stimulate the decision making of excessive risk taking, generating therefore consequences undesirable in terms of systemic risk (Systemic Risk) in the market. Therefore, as a first step, we study the structure of incentives that may cause or contribute to opportunistic behavior of a chief executive officer, this behavior can create individual interests that encourage excessive risk -taking. In this paper analyzes various theoretical views are considered, from the classical approach of agency theory aspects, from psychology and managerial power, equity theory and relates and particularize the banking business. Banks compensation systems often lead to more complex wage schemes than in other sectors and there is reasonable question to be raised regarding their transparency and their efficiency. We will study the many factors that influencing the efficiency of financial institutions compensation system banking of and investigate how the remuneration of directors and chief executives officer is affected by the different economic factors of the Spanish financial institutions to be effective and to reduce the pressure on the system of risk management and improve the bank's solvency in the long term.