El enfoque de las capacidades, las generaciones futuras y la reducción del sufrimiento extremo

  1. Torres Aldave, Mikel 1
  1. 1 Universidad del País Vasco (UPV/EHU)
Zeitschrift:
Isegoría: Revista de filosofía moral y política

ISSN: 1130-2097

Datum der Publikation: 2023

Nummer: 68

Art: Artikel

DOI: 10.3989/ISEGORIA.2023.68.24 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen Access editor

Andere Publikationen in: Isegoría: Revista de filosofía moral y política

Zusammenfassung

Despite being one of the leading theories of justice, the capabilities approach has not dealt with the problems of our duties towards the environment and future generations. To overcome this problem, Gómez has presented helpful ideas about how the approach could incorporate these duties. Although Gómez’s ideas represent an invaluable contribution to the literature on the capabilities approach, in this paper I defend that her ideas must be supplemented with arguments in favour of the obligation of reducing extreme suffering. In particular, the capabilities approach should defend the obligations of becoming vegan/vegetarian, helping animals in nature and reducing human overpopulation.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet