Cuando la acción moral no provoca admiración sino resentimientoel rechazo del rebelde moral

  1. Aitziber Pascual
  2. Susana Conejero
  3. Itziar Etxebarria
Zeitschrift:
Aposta: Revista de ciencias sociales

ISSN: 1696-7348

Datum der Publikation: 2022

Nummer: 93

Seiten: 79-93

Art: Artikel

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Andere Publikationen in: Aposta: Revista de ciencias sociales

Zusammenfassung

The observation of morally exemplary actions normally provokes positive emotions (admiration, respect...) with respect to the one who performs them. When the actions are particularly costly or unusual, it can even provoke moral elevation, an emotion that leads to a desire to be in close contact with the person who acts in this way, to emulate his or her behavior and to become a better person. However, this is not always the case. Sometimes the action of the moral rebel, the person who does not accept to remain silent or adapt to what others do when it contravenes his/her principles and values, provokes rejection and resentment. This text reviews the current research on this paradoxical phenomenon: The empirical studies that support it, how it can be explained, the defensive strategies that are put in place against the moral rebel and the personal characteristics of moral rebels. Finally, it reflects on the implications of the moral rebel's rejection both for the moral rebel and for the social group.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet