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Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
info
Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
Lejona, España
ISSN: 1577-9424
Datum der Publikation: 2021
Titel der Ausgabe: Kripkeren Naming and Necessityk 40 (+1) urte
Nummer: 22
Seiten: 3-31
Art: Artikel
Andere Publikationen in: Gogoa: Euskal Herriko Unibersitateko hizkuntza, ezagutza, komunikazio eta ekintzari buruzko aldizkaria
Zusammenfassung
"Kripkeren Naming and Necessityk 40 (+1) urte" ale bereziaren aurkezpena
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